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THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT AND THE
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE IN THE YEARS
1961, i962 AND 1963
TERENCE C. PoRTER*
This article is a review of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri for the years 1961, 1962 and 1963 which considered the "humanitarian
doctrine." All cases have been reviewed, and a summary of notable cases
follows later in this article.
Generally, the "humanitarian doctrine," "humanitarian rule" or "hu-
manitarian negligence," as it is variously denominated, escaped the years
reviewed herein with little change. None of the more significant and per-
plexing questions raised in previous articles were answered.1
The early, landmark case of Banks v. Morris & Co.2 sets out the
elements of the humanitarian doctrine as follows:
(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril; (2) defendant had notice
thereof (if it was the duty of defendant to have been on the lookout,
constructive notice suffices); (3) defendant after receiving such
notice had the present ability, with the means at hand, to have
averted the impending injury without injury to himself or others;
(4) he failed to exercise ordinary care to avert such impending in-
jury; and (5) by reason thereof plaintiff was injured.3
These elements encompass, in addition to the body of law commonly re-
ferred to as the "last clear chance doctrine" which is in effect in many
states, and an extension which is peculiar to Missouri jurisprudence. The
extension which sets the "humanitarian doctrine" apart from the "last clear
chance" cases is to allow recovery where plaintiff by his own negligent inat-
tentiveness (obliviousness) places himself into a position of imminent peril
of collision from which he could extricate himself, but for his obliviousness.
The position of imminent peril is discoverable by the other dryer involved,
but due to the latter's negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness) he does
*Attorney, Columbia, Missouri; LL.B., University of Missouri, 1958.
1. Becker & Porter, The Missouri Humanitarian Doctrine 1958-60, 26 Mo. L.
Rnv. 26 (1961).
2. 302 Mo. 254, 257 S.W. 482 (En Banc 1924).
3. Id. at 484.
(174)
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not so discover in time thereafter to take some action within the means and
appliances at hand to avoid the collision. In this situation, an injured plain-
tiff can make a submissible jury question on his right to recover for the other
driver's negligence.
In other jurisdictions, where the last clear chance doctrine is applied,
plaintiff would be precluded from recovery in the above situation. The last
clear chance doctrine is usually recognized as being limited to the three
following situations:
(1) Plaintiff's peril results from plvysical helplessness which defend-
ant has actually discovered, and defendant thereafter has the ability
to avoid the accident and injury, or
(2) Plaintiff's peril results from pkysical helplessness and defend-
ant does not actually discover this peril, but in the exercise of
proper degree of care could have discovered it and thereafter had
the ability to avoid the accident and injury, or
(3) Plaintiff's peril results from mere negligent inattentiveness,
(obliviousness), not physical helplessness, which defendant has dis-
covered and in time thereafter has the ability to avoid the accident
and injury to the plaintiff.
Missouri goes the next step, as noted, and does not penalize plaintiff for
getting himself into a position of peril by reason of his negligent inatten-
tiveness, when defendant fails to discover the plaintiff by reason of his
own negligent inattentiveness.
Although the scope of this article is restricted to a review of Missouri
Supreme Court decisions, it seems appropriate to mention the recent
adoption by the supreme court of the Missouri Approved Instructions. 4
This action will probably have a more far-reaching effect on the humanitar-
ian doctrine than any case decided during the period reviewed. One of the
more significant changes brought about by the new instructions is the
elimination of the "sole cause" instruction by Rule 1.03 which states: "No
instruction shall be given on behalf of the defendant which hypothesizes
that the conduct of one other than defendant was the sole cause of the
occurrence."
This rule ends a long chapter of frustration on the part of the trial
and appellate courts and lawyers involved in automobile accident litigation
wherein the humanitarian doctrine is involved and a sole cause instruction
is given. The death knell for the sole cause instruction has been sounding
4. Mo. R. Civ. PRoc. 70.01.
1964]
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for many years in Missouri, yet many practitioners have refused to heed
the warnings.
The beginning of the end of the sole cause instruction (which up to
now has been an inseparable, though often disreputable adjunct to the
,humanitarian doctrine) was marked by the decision of Janssens v. Thromp-
son." Thereafter follows a long line of cases wrestling with the problem,
but yielding little by way of solution to stem the tide of appeals on the
ground that defendant's sole cause instruction was prejudicially erroneous.
In the years reviewed the court made a very conscious effort to correct
the abuses resulting from the use of the sole cause instruction. Foremost
among the decisions is Quigley v. Sneed" decided in 1963, in which the su-
preme court, in a rather resigned fashion, remarked:
We thus have presented again the ever vexing problem of the use
of a sole cause instruction in a case in which plaintiff's submission
is based on humanitarian negligence. We shall review the general
rules.7
The court then proceeded to outline with clarity and simplicity the exact
guidepost to be used in framing a sole cause instruction.
Apparently doubting that the mesesage would reach all quarters or
that hearers would resist temptation, the court thereafter eliminated the
problem by the "no-instruction" rule.
Much of the court's attention during the period was devoted to the
question of submissibility. As in past years, painstaking consideration was
given to factual detail and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Every effort was made to sustain the trial court's decision and in this effort
some of the cases involved some rather novel approaches to the evidence.
For example, in the case of Appelhans v. Goldman,8 defendant testified he
had reduced his speed from twenty-five to five miles per hour in twenty-
five feet. The court reasoned from this that the jury could have used the
same ratio and thereby found defendant could have stopped in another six
and one-fourth feet. In Bell v. Pedigog the court took judicial notice that
a six-year-old boy, running in a semi-circle and covering fifteen feet of dis-
tance in all, would move at five to six miles per hour or would transverse
this distance in this manner in two seconds.
5. 360 Mo. 351, 228 S.W.2d 743 (En Banc 1950).
6. 367 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. 1963).
7. Id. at 640.
8. 349 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 1961).
9. 364 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1963).
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On the question of where the zone of peril arises in a right-angle inter-
section collision, the court again pointed out that a jury can find plaintiff
was in a position of imminent peril prior to the time he actually entered
defendant's path. As stated in the case of Reedy v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R.R.,' 0 the zone of peril may be extended beyond defendant's immediate
path by plaintiff's obliviousness as well as by physical facts such as plain-
tiff's speed, the size of the vehicle or the nature of the terrain which reason-
ably indicate plaintiff will be unable to stop short of defendant's path.
In two cases1" complaints were made concerning instructions which
contained either misspelled words or errors in directions such as "east" for
"west" and "right" for "left." As all that is necessary is the instruction be
substantially correct, insignificant clerical errors do not amount to misdirec-
tion of the jury. Nor does the spelling of "imminent" as "eminent."
I. SUMMARY OF NOTABLE CASES
Hil v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,' 2 arose as a result of a collision between
a streetcar operating north on a fixed track on Grand Avenue in St. Louis,
and an automobile driven by plaintiff's deceased husband. The automobile
angled away from the right-hand curb in a northwesterly direction in front
of the streetcar to the place of collision. The, point of impact between the
vehicles was the right front of the streetcar and left side of the automobile.
The case was submitted to the jury on humanitarian negligence in failing
to stop the streetcar to avoid the collision. Plaintiff recovered a judgment of
$12,500 in the trial court and defendant appealed charging plaintiff failed
to make a submissible case. The supreme court affirmed the verdict and
judgment of the trial court. The question of submissibility was determined
in favor of plaintiff on the basis of inferences which were drawn from the
testimony of the streetcar operator. The court made an interesting analysis
of the evidence and determined that had the brakes on the streetcar been
applied at the time the decedent entered a position of imminent peril the
collision would not have occurred. The automobile was moving away from
the streetcar and had the streetcar brakes been applied, the speed of
the car, as compared with that of the streetcar, would have been sufficient to
allow the decedent's automobile to move out of the way. (The automobile
10. 347 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1961).
11. Wegner v. St. Louis County Transit Co., 357 S.W.2d 943 (Mo. 1962);
Edwards v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 365 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1963).
12. 340 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. 1960).
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was traveling fifteen miles per hour and the streetcar twenty miles per hour
at the time of peril.)
Kirks v. Waller 8 was an action for personal injuries received by a five-
year-old child as a result of being struck by a pickup truck. The accident
occurred during daylight hours. Defendant was traveling west on 87th
Street in Kansas City, Missouri, at thirty to thirty-five miles per hour
when the child darted from south to north in front of the pickup. A jury
verdict was returned in favor of defendant and the trial court sustained
plaintiff's motion for new trial for error in giving an instruction. The supreme
court reversed the trial court and reinstated the jury vedict on the ground
that plaintiff had failed to make a submissible case of humanitarian negli-
gence. Plaintiff's case was submitted to the jury on the theory "defendant
could have swerved said truck and given a warning of its approach and
thereby have avoided injuring plaintiff."' 4 This submission was similar to
that contained in Frandeka v. St. Louis Public Service Company, '15 where
two acts had been submitted in combination as constituting negligence. The
evidence in the Kirks case indicated the child started from a standstill from
a point ten feet south of the pavement and ran some nineteen feet to a point
just south of the center of the westbound lane, where he was struck by de-
fendant's truck. The supreme court ruled the question of submissibility
against plaintiff on the ground that after plaintiff's position of imminent
peril was discoverable, neither of the submitted acts of negligence, either
individually or in combination, would have been sufficent to have avoided
the accident. As to the submission of failure to warn, the court discussed
the double reaction time and held there would not have been time to have
avoided the collision. Further, the court doubted the soundness of the theory
that a warning would have been reacted upon favorably by plaintiff,
who was five years old. The court would not hold defendant negligent for
failure to swerve because there was evidence defendant had made an ef-
fective attempt to stop and had left fifty-eight feet of skidmarks. The court
said as, in the available time, it was only possible to do one of two things
and defendant did do one of those things, it was not negligence for defendant
not to have done the other thing. This combination of the warning and the
swerve submissions placed a burden upon defendant which was undue under
the circumstances. Defendant had made a substantial effort to stop or
13. 341 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. 1961).
14. Id. at 864.
15. 361 Mo. 245, 234 S.W.2d 540 (1950).
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slacken his speed and was not charged with the obligation, in addition
thereto, to swerve.
Reedy v. Missourwi-Kansas-Texas Railwoay Companyle arose out of a
grade-crossing, train-truck collision which occurred during daylight hours,
in Harwood, Missouri. Plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment of
$17,000 aganst defendant railroad company in the trial court for the death
of her husband. The opinion does not state the specific act of negligence
submitted; however, since the opinion does state the case was submitted on
the humanitarian doctrine, it will be presumed that the submission was for
failure either to slacken speed or to stop. The evidence indicated the acci-
dent occurred as the decedent proceeded onto defendant's main line track
traveling east at a time when defendant's diesel locomotive unit and pas-
senger cars were traveling north. The right rear of the decedent's truck was
struck by the right front of the diesel locomotive. Plaintiff's evidence showed
the truck travelled at a constant speed of ten to twelve miles per hour from
a point about 100 feet east of the track until the time of collision. Plaintiff
attempted to sustain the submissibility of her case on the theory the zone
of peril should have extended back to the point where certain obstructions
along the track were likely to interfere with the view of the decedent in
the direction from which the train approached. The court refused this
contention and stated:
An engineer or fireman of a railroad locomotive upon seeing a motor
vehicle approaching a crossing while such motor vehicle is still in
a place of safety, and at such distance from the crossing as to allow
the driver a reasonable time to stop before going upon the crossing
and into the path of the train, is entitled to assume that the driver
is not oblivious and will stop short of the path of the approaching
train unless the driver shows some reasonable appearance of obliv-
iousness....
The defendant's duty under the humanitarian doctrine did
not arise until its fireman or engineer saw or in the exercise of or-
dinary care could have seen that Mr. Reedy was oblivious of the
approach of the train and intended to proceed across its path or
that, oblivious or not, Mr. Reedy was unable to stop short of its
path.17
The court found there was no evidence to warn the train crew of Mr.
Reedy's obliviousness as his truck approached the track. The speed of his
16. 347 S.W2d 111 (Mo. 1961).
17. Id. at 116.
19641
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truck did not indicate obliviousness and when the decedent reached a point
where he was no longer able to stop short of proceeding into the path of
the train, the train crew was unable to take any action to avoid the collision.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's verdict outright and entered
judgment for the defendant.
Siegel v. Peters", is a companion case to Rosenfeld v. Peters' reviewed
in the last article on the humanitarian doctrine,20 having arisen from the
same automobile collision. Plaintiff was driving an automobile west on U. S.
Highway 40 just outside the City of St. Louis at a point where Highway
40 is a four-lane divided highway with a grass median strip. Plaintiff stopped
his vehicle and turned south into a cross-over and stopped to wait to turn
back east toward St. Louis. After stopping and observing defendant's ve-
hicle approaching from the west, plaintiff pulled into the eastbound por-
tion of Highway 40. Plaintiff's vehicle was struck in the left rear as it com-
pleted the "U" turn. The case was submitted to the jury on humanitarian
negligence in failing to sound a warning, and a verdict returned for defend-
ant. On appeal plaintiff questioned the giving of certain of defendant's in-
structions. Both were converse instructions and are set out in full in the
opinion. Both instructions were approved and the judgment affirmed. One
instruction hypothesized that at the time plaintiff entered a position of peril,
defendant's automobile was so close to plaintiff's that the sounding of a
warning would not have avoided the collision. The other directed a verdict
for defendant if the jury found a warning was in fact sounded. The supreme
court rejected plaintiff's complaint that these instructions conflicted, and
affirmed the judgment. Both instructions were simple converses of essential
elements of plaintiff's verdict directing instruction.
Appeluzns v. Goldmai21 resulted from a right angle intersection col-
lision where the left rear of the northbound vehicle in which plaintiff was
a passenger was struck by the front of defendant's eastbound vehicle.
The driver of plaintiff's automobile was her 16-year-old son, who was,
according to defendant's testimony, oblivious to the danger. The case
was submitted on failure to stop and the principal issue involved was the
question of submissibility. The court reviewed the evidence in detail and
after various mathematical calculations found a submissible case had been
18. 347 S.W.2d 881(Mo. 1961).
19. 327 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1959).
20. Becker & Porter, The Missouri Humanitarian Doctrine in the Years 1958-
1960, 26 Mo. L. REv. 26 (1961).
21. 349 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 1961).
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made and affirmed a judgment pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of
plaintiff for $20,000. On the question of stopping distance, the court used
defendant's testimony that he had reduced his speed from twenty-five to
five miles per hour in twenty-five feet. The court found the jury could
logically use this same ratio and thereby determine defandant could
have stopped in another six and one-fourth feet. This evidence was held
to be determinative on the question of stopping distance. The principles
applied are not new. Nor was the fact situation unusual. The case is
reviewed in sufficient detail to be a good guide for preparing cases for
trial and testing the submissibility of humanitarian cases.
McDonough v. St. Louis Public Service Company 22 arose from a right
angle intersection case in which a westbound bus struck a police motor-
cycle or tri-car as it made a right turn onto the same street as the bus.
The case was submitted to the jury on failure "to have swerved said
motorbus and to have given a timely and adequate warning of the approach
and proximity of the bus. '23 A jury verdict in the amount of $29,000 was
returned in favor of plaintiff. After carefully analyzing the evidence, the
supreme court resolved the issue of submissibility in favor of plaintiff, but
reversed and remanded the case for error in plaintiff's verdict directing
instruction. The objectionable feature of plaintiff's instruction was the
failure to relate the act of negligence hypothesized to the events following
plaintiff's entry into a position of peril. The instruction read in part:
. .. that defendant's employee Maurath did fail to swerve said
motorbus, and did fail to give a timely and adequate warning of
the approach and proximity of said motorbus and was thereby
negligent in so failing .... 24
It was felt the jury might have based its findings on antecedent negligence
in failing to take the hypothesized action. This case shows the danger in de-
parting from the tried and true format for a verdict directing humanitarian
instruction.
Davis v. Quality Oil Company25 involved a collision between an oil
truck and an automobile driven by a sixteen-year-old boy at a "T" inter-
section on U.S. Highway 60. At this intersection, a side road "T'ed" into
Highway 60 with an island in the side road which forced traffic desiring to
22. 350 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. 1961).
23. Id. at 740.
24. Id. at 745.
25. 353 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1962).
1964]
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turn east on Highway 60 to take the right leg of the road around the
island. Westbound traffic turned to its left around the island. The boy's
vehicle was attempting to turn back eash onto Highway 60 after following
the left or westbound leg around the island. As he moved out onto Highway
60, he made a sweeping movement with his vehicle across the eastbound
lane of traffic and into the westbound lane with his car headed east and
southeast as defendant's truck approached from the east. At the time the
automobile started onto Highway 60, the truck was some 300 feet away.
The collision occurred when the automobile had moved back into the
eastbound lane and was struck as the truck swerved south into the east-
bound lane to attempt to avoid the car which an instant before had been
in the north or westbound lane of traffic. The case was submitted on
humanitarian negligence in failing to stop or slacken the speed of the
truck. The undisputed evidence indicated the truck driver had applied
his brakes and there were from 160 to 170 feet of skidmarks. After carefully
reviewing the evidence, the court concluded the driver of the automobile
did not enter a position of peril as he moved into the westbound lane
of traffic since at that time the truck was so far to the east there was no
certain, immediate, and impending danger of injury. Thereafter, as the
car continued its course and started moving out of the westbound lane
of traffic into the eastbound or south lane of traffic, it was moving out
of the path of the truck. However, as the car got back into the south or
eastbound lane of traffic and the truck approaching from the east also
swerved to that lane of traffic, then and only then did it enter a zone of
imminent peril. The evidence was clear that, thereafter, the truck driver
had no ability to take any action to avoid the collision, particularly the
submitted action of slackening the speed or stopping the truck because
the undisputed evidence indicated that all four brakes were locked before
the truck even went into the south or eastbound lane of traffic where it
struck the auomobile. Based on this review, the court held plaintiff had
failed to make a submissible case and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court entered on a jury verdict for defendant.
Wegner v. St. Louis County Transit Company26 arose from a right
angle intersection collision between an automobile and a bus at DeBaliviere
and Lindell in St. Louis. The streets were wet, but the weather was other-
wise clear. Trial resulted in a verdict in favor of defendant and plaintiff
26. 357 S.W.2d 943 (Mo. 1962).
[Vol. 29
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appealed. The sole issue involved was the propriety of the trial court's
refusal to give plaintiff's offered humanitarian instruction submittng failure
to warn or in the alternative to slacken speed. From its mathematical
computations from the evidence, the supreme court determined a sub-
missible humanitarian case had been made and the trial court therefore
had erred in its refusal to give the offered instruction. Defendant suggested
the trial court did not err since the disputed instruction hypothesized that
defendant's bus .was traveling "east" when all of the evidence indicated
the bus was traveling "west." Further, plaintiff had incorrectly spelled
imminent as "eminent." The supreme court said there errors were ob-
viously of a clerical nature and the instruction was substantially correct.
No error would have resulted from giving an instruction containing clerical
errors of this sort.
Carlson v. St. Louis Public Service Company27 involved a collision
which occurred when the right rear of plaintiff's car was struck by the right
front of -defendant's bus as plaintiff was attempting to turn into a driveway
to the left, across and in front of the bus. The automobile and bus were
approaching from opposite directions, during daylight hours, on a city
street. Trial before a jury resulted in a verdict for defendant and plaintiff
appealed. The supreme court first reviewed the evidence to determine
whether plaintiff had made a submissible case on her verdict directing in-
struction which submitted: "failing to stop or slacken speed and thus
avoid the collision."2 After carefully reviewing the evidence, the supreme
court held plaintiff had made a submissible case. The case was reversed
and remanded for a new trial for error in the giving of one of defendant's
instructions. This instructionwas a sole cause instruction and was held
to be erroneous as it failed to hypothesize some of the necessary factual
elements. An instruction of this would appear to be prohibited under the
new supreme court rules on instructions. This case contains a very detailed
analysis of plaintiff's evidence on the question of submissibility. An attorney
contemplating trial of a humanitarian case would do well to read this
case to review the technical manner in which evidence in a humanitarian
case must be presented.
Trautmanun v. Ham2G arose out of a right angle intersection collision
on U.S. Highway 40 at Sweet Springs, Missouri. Plaintiff sought damages
27. 358 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1962).
28. Id. at 798.
29. 358 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. 1962).
19641
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for the wrongful death of her husband, who was the operator of a northbound
pickup truck which was struck by defendants' westbound automobile while
crossing Highway 40. The left front of defendant's automobile struck the
right front of the decedent's pickup as the front of the pickup was about two
feet from the north edge of the pavement. The pavement was twenty-four
feet wide. The pickup was traveling at a constant speed of five miles per
hour. Defendant's autumobile was traveling forty-five miles per hour at
the time of impact. The case was submitted to the jury on humanitarian
negligence in "failing to have slackened its speed and changed its course
in a manner as to have avoided colliding with the pickup."30 A jury trial
resulted in a verdict for defendant, and plaintiff appealed alleging error
in the refusal to permit plaintiff to read in evidence a deposition of a
witness who was a resident of a county other than the site of the trial.
Proof having been properly made of that fact, the supreme court, after
finding plaintiff had made a submissible case, reversed and remanded the
case for error in excluding the deposition. On the question of submissibility,
the court reasoned that at the time decedent's truck entered the north-
bound lane of traffic, defendant's car was at least 166 feet east of the
point of collision. From the testimony that a vehicle traveling at forty
miles per hour could be stopped in 108 feet including reaction time, the
court found that although plaintiff had abandoned the assignment of
negligence of failure to stop, there was certainly sufficient evidence to
warrant a submission of failure to slacken speed.
Lucas v. Blanks- arose from an action for personal injuries to a
three-year-old child who was struck by defendant's automobile in the
City of Desoto, Missouri. The case was submitted to the jury on human-
itarian negligence for failure to slacken, stop, swerve or sound a warning.
A verdict was returned for defendant. On appeal, plaintiff challenged de-
fendant's instruction hypothesizing that as plaintiff came into a position
of peril defendant's automobile was "then so close that it was impossible
for the Defendant to prevent his automobile striking Plaintiff. 3 2 The
evidence indicated the three-year-old child had been in a party of several
children standing on the northwest comer of an intersection as defendant
proceeded north across the same. The evidence was conflicting as to the
position of plaintiff at the time she was struck by defendant's automobile.
30. Id. at 805.
31. 362 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1962).
32. Id. at 738.
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The court did not get to the question of submissibility, as it determined
the complained of instruction was not erroneous. This case is significant
as it contains an approved defendant's instruction hypothesizing the exact
facts submitted in plaintiff's verdict directing instruction and then (as a
negative converse) that defendant, after finding plaintiff in a position of
imminent peril was unable to take any action (as hypothesized in plain-
tiff's verdict directing instruction) to avoid the collision with plaintiff. The
principal complaint made by plaintiff was that the instruction should have
required the jury to find that defendant "in the exercise of the highest
degree of care" could not have acted to avoid hitting plaintiff. This case
should be compared with the following case. There, failure to include a
standard of care was fatal. The distinction seems to be that here defendant
hypothesized it was "impossible" to take evasive action whereas in the
Jolley case defendant simply hypothesized defendant was "unable" to take
evasive action. Impossible would seem to impose an even greater burden
than the exercise of the highest degree of care.
Jolley v. Lowe33 involved plaintiff's claim for personal injuries arising
from an automobile-pedestrian case in St. Louis. Plaintiff was a twelve-year-
old boy who struck defendant's automobile while running across Harrison
Avenue. A jury returned a verdict for defendant and plaintiff appealed.
Respondent did not file a brief on appeal and the supreme court confined
itself to the alleged error in defendant's instructions. Plaintiff had sub-
mitted his case to the jury on the humanitarian negligence hypothesizing:
'defendant could have sounded a warning or stopped his automobile and
thereby have avoided colliding with plaintiff." Defendant's negative con-
verse instruction read in part: "if you further find and believe that the
defendant was unable, in time thereafter to sound a warning or stop his
automobile, and that in so doing he was not negligent, then your verdict
should be for the defendant and against the plaintiff."'14 This instruction was
held erroneous first because there was no requirement in the instruction
concerning the standard of care applicable to defendant. The court held
it should have contained a finding that defendant in the exercise of "the
highest degree of care" was unable to sound a warning or stop the auto-
mobile in time to avoid colliding with plaintiff. Second, the court held
the instruction was indefinite and confusing because it failed to specify
the desired result of the action defendant was unable to take. The court
33. 362 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1962).
34. Id. at 743.
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held it should have contained a phrase "and thereby avoid colliding with
plaintiff," or some similar expression.
Finke v. United Film Servicez arose from an automobile intersection
collision. Though the case does not contain any significant points from
the strict technical aspects of the humanitarian doctrine, it is well worth
reading by any trial attorney. The case was submitted to the jury on
humanitarian negligence on the alleged failure to slow defendant's vehicle
or swerve it and to prevent the collision after plaintiff and his vehicle were
in a position of imminent peril. The trial before a jury resulted in a verdict
and judgment in favor of -defendant; plaintiff's appeal raised two principal
issues. The first dealt with defendant's offer at the close of his case to
read into evidence a Kansas City ordinance, relating to the right-of-way
of vehicles at an intersection. Plaintiff's counsel objected, stating he was
electing to submit his case to the jury on the humanitarian doctrine even
though up to that point the case had been tried on primary and human-
itarian averments in the pleadings. Defendant had also pleaded contributory
negligence. Plaintiff complained that introduction of the ordinance would
erroneously inject plaintiff's antecedent negligence into the case. The trial
court refused to honor plaintiff's statements that he was electing to submit
his case to the jury on a humanitarian instruction and allowed defendant
to introduce the ordinance. This position was upheld by the supreme
court, which felt the only way for plaintiff to save himself at this point
would have been to dismiss the primary negligence averments in his
petition. Having failed to do this, plaintiff was in no real position to com-
plain of the reading of the right-of-way ordinance, particularly since in
their opening statement, both plaintiff and defendant had relied and com-
mented on the right-of-way situation at this particular intersection. Plain-
tiff further complained on appeal of defendant's argument to the jury con-
cerning the actions of plaintiff in causing this accident. Plaintiff's complaint
basically was that this was an attempt to inject contributory negligence
into the case and was improper. This contention was likewise refused by
the supreme court and the case was affirmed. On this latter point the
supreme court noted that plaintiff's verdict directing humanitarian in-
struction, in addition to containing the usual "tail' which states to the
jury that plaintiff is not precluded from recovery by virtue of his own
contributory negligence, also contained a statement which indicates that
35. 363 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1962).
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even though contributory negligence would not preclude the plaintiff from
recovery, the jury must absolve him from any "sole cause" negligence.
The "tail" of this instruction reads as follows: ". . . then your verdict
must be for the plaintiff Mr. Finke, and this is the law and is true, even
if you should believe that Mr. Finke was himself negligent, and thereby
directly contributed to said collision, but did not solely cause same, if you
so find."'36 The court felt that the plaintiff, by this instruction, had opened
the door for defendant's argument.
Bell v. Pedgo7 is more significant and more famous by reason of
the fact that it conclusively established as clearly erroneous, burden of
proof instructions using the expressions such as "reasonable satisfaction of
jury" and "satisfaction of jury," than for any discussion of instructions.
As stated in the last paragraph of the opinion, from and after date of
this case instructions using such phrases are to be considered reversibly
erroneous. The significance of this case has since been dimmed by the
supreme court rules on instructions which tend to eliminate any of the here-
tofore acceptable burden of proof instructions and substitute a completely
new concept of burden of proof or burden of persuasion.
The questions concerning the humanitarian doctrine that arose in this
case involve submissibility. Plaintiff had filed suit to recover $25,000
damages for the wrongful death of her six-year-old son. A jury verdict
and judgment was rendered for defendant and plaintiff appealed. From
the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, the supreme court found that the
child had been standing along the east railing of a bridge spanning a creek
as defendant's vehicle approached from the south. At some point, as
defendant approached, the child had left the bridge railing and moved
out into the roadway toward the center of the road, then some distance
north and then back toward the east edge of the roadway. He was struck
before he reached the shoulder of the roadway. From the testimony, the
court found that the child had traveled in a semi-circle a distance of about
15 feet. The evidence was that the child was running and the court took
judicial notice that a running child would move at a speed of five to six
miles per hour. It reasoned the movement of the child would take approx-
imately two seconds. Defendant testified that as he approached the bridge
his truck was traveling twenty-five miles per hour. His brakes, tires and
36. Id. at 662.
37. 364 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1963).
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horn were in good condition, and he could have stopped the truck at the
speed and under the conditions there existing in fifteen to twenty feet.
Traveling at twenty-five miles per hour, the court found defendant would
have been seventy-three feet back to the south at the time the child
moved from the bridge railing out into the pavement and started his
semi-circle movement consuming the fifteen feet mentioned. The court
then gave defendant the benefit of the doubt and assumed his testimony
as to his ability to stop in fifteen to twenty feet did not involve reaction
time. Therefore, his reaction time of three-quarters of a second at twenty-
five miles per hour was added to the fifteen to twenty feet stopping dis-
tance and it was apparent that at the time the child left the bridge railing
and started his movement out into the roadway defendant could have
brought his vehicle to a stop within forty-eight feet and thereby have avoided
striking the child.
In Edwards v. St. Louis Public Service Compay,38 plaintiff sought
recovery for personal injuries received in a collision between his automobile
and a bus. Plaintiff's westbound automobile and the eastbound bus were
approaching each other from opposite directions at a point where it was
necessary for plaintiff to make a "U" turn across and in front of the path
of defendant's bus to get to his home on the south side of the street. The
collision occurred after plaintiff's automobile had traveled about seven or
eight feet across the centerline into the lane of traffic in which defendant's
bus was traveling. Trial in the circuit court resulted in a jury verdict
in favor of defendant and plaintiff appealed. On appeal the question of
submissibility seems to have been conceded. Plaintiff's submission was on
humanitarian negligence for failure to stop. Plaintiff's principal complaint
on appeal involved two instructions given by defendant. Each instruction
was in effect a negative converse of plaintiff's verdict directing instruction.
One was considerably longer than the other, hypothesizing various facts
and ending with a finding that, if after plaintiff placed himself in a position
of imminent peril, it was then too late for the bus driver, with the means
and appliances at hand and in the exercise of the highest degree of care,
to have avoided the collision, the verdict should be for defendant. The
other instruction given by defendant was very similar; however, it did
not hypothesize any of the factual elements, but simply negatived plain-
tiff's verdict directing instruction. Plaintiff complained of one instruction
38. 365 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1963).
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because the word "right" had inadvertently been used instead of "left"
and further, defendant had injected antecedent negligence into the case
by hypothesizing that plaintiff had made a "U" turn. Both contentions
were refused by the supreme court and the decision of the trial court was
affirmed. Both of the instructions given by defendant are set out in their
entirety. One seems to be a very acceptable model of a negative converse
instruction in a humanitarian case and certainly seems to receive the
approval of the supreme court. Of course, this instruction may be un-
acceptable at this time in view of the new rules concerning instructions.
Rephlo v. Weber- arose from an automobile-truck collision in St. Louis
at the "T" intersection of Alfred and Magnolia Streets. Plaintiff was travel-
ing south on Alfred Street, which dead-ends into Magnolia, and intended
to turn to the left or toward the east. In so doing she was required to
cross the path of defendant's westbound truck. Plaintiffs automobile was
struck on the left rear side by defendant's truck as she was in the process
of crossing the centerline at Magnolia Street. The case was submitted to
the jury on humanitarian negligence in that "defendant failed to timely
slacken the speed of his truck and that he failed to angle his truck toward
and into the northernmost lane of Magnolia Avenue. . ... 4 The jury
returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed complaining of de-
fendant's converse instruction which after hypothesizing various facts
stated: ". . . and further find that at such time the defendant Weber, in
the exercise of the highest degree of care, could not avoid the collision
by slackening the speed of his notor vehicle, then the Court instructs you
your verdict must be in favor of the defendant Weber."4'1 (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff complained that this converse instruction completely ignored and
was inconsistent with her verdict directing instruction which submitted
in the conjunctive the slackening of speed and turning to the right. The
supreme court agreed with plaintiff and reversed and remanded the case
for the error in giving this instruction. The court found plaintiff's verdict
directing instruction submitting slackening and turning to the right was
one submission; therefore, under the facts both acts, that is, slackening and
swerving, would be required to have a submissible case. Therefore, de-
fendant's instruction which conversed only one of the two united elements
of the submission was erroneous.
39. 367 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1963).
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In Quigley v. Sneed ' 2 plaintiff was injured when her southbound auto-
mobile was struck in the left rear by defendant's westbound automobile
as plaintiff attempted to pull out of a side street and turn left across de-
fendant's path at a "T" intersection. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for
defendant and plaintiff appealed. The supreme court reviewed the facts to
determine the question of submissibility and held a submissible case had
been made. The court then considered plaintiff's complaints with respect
to defendant's sole cause instruction. The principal complaint was'that the
first paragraph of the sole cause instruction contained an abstract state-
ment of the law to the effect that the driver of a vehicle shall stop at the
entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right-of-way to other
vehicles which have entered the intersection on the through highway.
This is not a new complaint; instructions containing abstract propositions
of law have often been held to be erroneous in many cases. The supreme
court reversed the case and remanded it for a new trial for error in giving
this instruction, stating that the abstract statement of the law tended to in-
ject plaintiff's antecedent negligence into her case and was hereby erroneous.
The court rather exhaustively reviewed the rules under which a sole
cause instruction may be given. It has been mentioned earlier in this article
that such instructions have now been eliminated from the trial of human-
itarian cases. However, the opinion is noteworthy because it explains (as
has been previously explained by the supreme court in Rosenfeld v.
Peters3) that such instructions in reality are not necessary in a human-
itarian case since defendant can achieve the same result by a more legitimate
and safer route.
II. CONCLUSION
The humanitarian doctrine at the end of 1963 was little changed by
the decisions handed down in the years 1961, 1962 and 1963. However this
is not to say that its use in the years to follow will not be affected by
the supreme court's activity in this period.
The adoption of pattern instructions will undoubtedly have great
effect on the practical use of the doctrine in the field of trial practice.
Many of the supreme court's decisions of years past now will involve
moot questions. No longer will it be necessary for the court to labor over
42. 367 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. 1963).
43. Supra note 19.
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pages of opinion to explain why the handiwork of some inspired attorney
does or does not contain prejudicially erroneous direction to the jury. Here-
after, both the courts and the lawyers will be freed from the time con-
suming and ultrahazardous field of writing jury instructions and will
thereby have more time to devote to orderly and effective development
of the factual basis necessary for application of the doctrine. Perhaps this
will result in an early presentation to the court of the old hypothetical
question: "When plaintiff and defendant each are guilty of humanitarian
negligence of the same quality and timing, may each recover damages from
the other for personal injuries?""
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